Research Papers

Do We Learn From Mistakes of Others? A Test of Observational Learning in the Bandit Problem.

Abstract: I experimentally investigate observational (social) learning in the simple two-armed bandit framework where the models based on Bayesian reasoning and non-Bayesian reasoning (count heuristics) have different predictions. The results contradict the predictions of the Bayesian rationality e.g. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Naıve herding model (BRTNI): Subjects follow the choices that contain no information about the state of the world, follow the coinciding choices of others (though it is empirically suboptimal), sustain losses making every first choice and cascade earlier than Bayesian-based models predict, but not in a random way. In addition, the Quantal Response Equilibrium is tested and the robustness of the theory questioned.
[Download PDF]

Short- and Long-run Effects of External Interventions on Trust. 
with Simone Vannuccini  (FSU-Jena) 

Abstract: We experimentally analyze the effects of external intervention such as subsidy and targeting on the investment decision during the intervention and after. We employ a multi-period version of the trust (investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) introducing either a monetary incentives for contribution or providing a suggestion about the level of investment. The results of the experiment indicate  that targeting is an effective instrument to promote trustful behavior, whereas subsidy policy is not effective both in short- and long-run.  Therefore  we suggest considering a targeting policy as one of the instruments that can foster trustful behavior. 
 [Download PDF]

 On the observational learning in the optimal stopping problem.
with Arno Riedl  (Maastricht University)

Abstract: We experimentally test the theoretical predictions about observational learning in case of the optimal stopping problem with publicly observable behavior but privately observable payoffs. The paper focuses on the two-agents two-arms bandit framework and follows the theoretical analysis of Rosenberg et al. (2007).  Rational behavior in the framework implies solving a non-trivial optimization task. That raises the question whether people act according to the theoretical predictions. We find evidence that subjects overreact on thier own outcomes and comply with the choices of others.
[Download PDF]

Confidence, Confidence Training and Entrepreneurial Behavior: Field Experiment.​
with Alla Levitskaia (Comrat State University)

Abstract: ​We provide a field experiment to study the effect of  an entrepreneurial program in Gagauzia region, Moldova. We randomly assign applicants for the entrepreneurship training to three educational tracks: (1) Business and confidence training; (2) Confidence training; (3) No training (control group). To understand underlying behavioral mechanisms of the intervention we elicit in the lab-in-field experiment participants'  behavioral characteristics. We find that confidence and ambiguity preference, but not risk preferences or self-efficacy,  associated with entrepreneurial behavior. We also find that a combination of business and confidence training affect an entrepreneurial related decision.​
[Download PDF]

Is Self-employment a Career Trap? Large-Scale Field Experiment in the Labor market
with Maria Mavlikeeva (University of Kassel)

Abstract: ​We provide a large-scale correspondence experiment by sending more than 12 000 fictitious resumes in Russia to assess treatment of self-employed at the labor market.  Our study is the first correspondence experiment in Russia (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).  Thus, to ensure validity of the experiment in the new context, we, also, assess discrimination against ethnic minorities. We find that the level of ethnic discrimination in Russia is comparable to the world average (Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016). More importantly, we find discrimination against self-employed. However, we observe discrimination against self-employed at the low-skill market but not on the high-skill level market.  Those results go in lines with statistical form of discrimination of self-employed. 
 
This study is registered in the AEA RCT Registry and the unique identifying number is AEARCTR-0001308.